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1. THE SACCO-VANZETTI CASE 
Arrested in May, 1920, and charged with robbery and murder, Sacco and 
Vanzetti, two Italian immigrants, were convicted in a Massachusetts court of 
law a year later. After seven years in captivity, the men were condemned to 
death in April, 1927, sentence being carried out, in the midst of national and 
international protest, on 23 August.  
In the years leading up to their execution, several requests for a retrial 
were rejected by Webster Thayer, the same judge who had presided over 
their trial, and who was on record as having made disparaging remarks about 
the defendants in public. Judge Thayer claimed that his adverse decision was 
based on what he called the defendants’ “consciousness of guilt”. This 
stemmed from the inconsistencies in their testimonies soon after being 
arrested; however, if we consider the events taking place in the United States 
at the time, the defendants’ behaviour seems quite consistent with the 
circumstances.  
To a great many people in the United States and the world over, what 
took place in the courtroom during the trial was immoral. Notwithstanding 
the widely commented upon bias of the trial judge, Sacco and Vanzetti, 
anarchists both, were confronted by the partiality of public opinion 
exacerbated by a government lead effort to counter the accruing leftist trend 
in the country that followed the triumph of the Russian Revolution. 
Owing to the press coverage of the crime and the subsequent arrest of the 
two immigrant suspects, Sacco and Vanzetti were already famous by the time 
their trial commenced on 31 May 1921. Media coverage saw to it that the 
public at large was informed that the defendants were not only Reds, but they 
were also traitorous draft dodgers, who had fled to Mexico to avoid serving 
their adopted country in First World War. And to top it all, their chief 
counsel, Fred Moore, was known to have previously defended anarcho-
syndicalist cases with success.  




It is not unreasonable to suspect that the Red Scare of the 1920s had an 
impact on the jurors. Less than a year before Sacco and Vanzetti were 
arrested, more than a dozen bombs had been set off in several cities in the 
United States. Anarchists were blamed and a nationwide crackdown on 
leftists was launched. US Attorney General A. Mitchel Palmer was the object 
of a terrorist bomb attack himself in 1919.  In January, 1920, Palmer had 
2,500 hundred suspects rounded up during the so-called Red Raids. 
According to Joughlin and Morgan (1978: 213), six thousand warrants were 
eventually issued and four thousand arrests made across the country. In 
Boston, not far from where four months later Sacco and Vanzetti would be 
escorted by armed guards to trial on trumped up charges, leftist detainees 
were paraded through the streets in chains. Shortly before Sacco and Vanzetti 
were detained, Andrea Salsedo, an Italian immigrant and anarchist, fell to his 
death in New York City while in the custody of Department of Justice 
detectives. Understandably, fearing the worst, many leftists went into hiding 
or at the very least tempered their choice of words in public. 
This, then, was the emotionally charged background of the trial that 
commenced on May 5th, 1920. The inconsistencies observed in Sacco and 
Vanzetti’s early testimonies, which had so convinced Judge Thayer of their 
guilt, were in direct response to the emotional intensity of the times. Lying to 
avoid revealing their political persuasion at the time of their arrest makes 
perfect sense, especially in light of what had befallen their Anarchist comrade 
Salsedo shortly before their own detention.  
Judge Thayer’s own inconsistencies were patent when it came to giving 
credence to the contradictory testimonies of several of the prosecution’s 
witnesses. On the witness stand, Louis Pelser identified Sacco as one of the 
bandits. Pelser would later retract his testimony in an affidavit, only to recant 
it once again after meeting privately with the prosecuting attorney, Frederick 
G. Katzman. Another witness who reversed his testimony was Carlos E. 
Goodridge, who at the time was facing criminal charges himself, making his 
testimony on behalf of the state highly suspect. Also inconsistent was the 
testimony given by Mary E. Splaine, who would later confess that she had 
been pressured into doing so by the District Attorney.  
Reason would naturally dictate that these inconsistencies should have 
sufficed for a retrial. If we add to the argument that one of the jury members 
was on record for having voiced his prejudice in public against the 
defendants, and that the testimony of one of the prosecution’s firearms 
experts, a police officer, was later retracted in an affidavit claiming that the 
prosecuting attorney had coerced him, then it would seem that legal sanction 
had been provided for a lynching.     




A little over a year before Sacco and Vanzetti were put to death, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Massachusetts denied a last ditch 
appeal on the grounds that legally it was not authorised to review evidence 
presented in a lower court. The lives of the two men were, thus, left in the 
hands of Judge Webster Taylor. 
In a document entitled Some Questions and an Appeal, which was 
published by the Independent Sacco-Vanzetti Committee, Michael A. Cohn 
(1927) presented thirty-two elaborate queries to those individuals who 
thought that Sacco and Vanzetti had had a fair trial in the courts of 
Massachusetts, and that the prosecuting attorney, the Judge and the jury were 
not biased by passion and prejudice.  
Question number one refers to the unknown whereabouts of the other 
three participants in the Slater and Morrill shoe factory hold-up and the 
subsequent murder of payroll guards, Frederick A. Parmenter and Alexander 
Berardelli.  The second question points to the fact that the hold-up money had 
neither ever been located nor traced to the defendants. Third, the author 
questions the trustworthiness of the witnesses for the prosecution, who were 
“recruited from among the lowest moral and criminal types” (Cohn, 1927: 2). 
He further indicts even the official court interpreter who soon after the trial 
was imprisoned for larceny, while in his next question he notes that all of the 
witnesses for the defence had been disregarded.  
In question number five Cohn addresses the ridiculousness of supposing 
that Sacco would have carried a murder weapon on his person three weeks 
after committing a capital crime. In his next query Cohn notes the 
preposterousness of the supposition that Vanzetti would have hung on to 
murder victim Barardelli’s pistol all that time. Then he goes on to question 
the likelihood that, after having committed murder in broad daylight in a 
nearby municipality, the two men would have continued showing themselves 
in public to distribute circulars announcing a meeting, at which Vanzetti 
would speak, to protest the recent death of their colleague Salsedo while in 
the custody of Federal agents in New York City. 
The eighth question finds it inconceivable that a skilful and highly 
respected factory worker like Sacco, with no police record, should fall in with 
a gang of professional bandits and killers. He notes that Vanzetti’s record 
was also clean, bringing attention to the fact that the “eminent jurists” held 
that Vanzetti’s conviction for the Bridgewater hold-up of 24 December 1919 
“was a frame-up” (Cohn, 1927: 3), which was attested by the fact that twenty 
witnesses had testified that Vanzetti had been at his work post at the time the 
crime was committed. Cohn also points out that Vanzetti’s lawyer, John 
Vahey, who had advised Vanzetti not to take the stand in his own defence, 
had since become a law firm partner of the Sacco-Vanzetti trial prosecution 




lawyer, Frederick G. Katzmann, suggesting that collusion could have been 
involved in that case. 
The ninth question addresses the scandalous identification method that 
was used when Sacco and Vanzetti were initially detained. Whereas in a 
police line-up, suspects are typically presented in the midst of other people of 
similar physical characteristics, Sacco and Vanzetti were displayed singly 
and even made to simulate the behaviour of the Braintree outlaws.  
The next question is devoted to the consciousness of guilt factor, which, 
as I have already mentioned, was a key to Judge Webster Thayer’s insistence 
upon the culpability of both men. Judge Thayer held that if they had had 
nothing to hide, then they would not have lied about their doings on the night 
they were arrested. The defence argued that Sacco and Vanzetti had been 
afraid to reveal their radicalism at that time, especially in light of the  
macabre events that had occurred during the Red Scare era, not the least of 
which being the recent death under suspicious circumstances of their 
colleague Salsedo. Cohn (1927: 3) asks, “Is the consciousness of radicalism 
synonymous with the consciousness of guilt of murder?”. 
In question 11, the author underscores the bias and base jingoism that 
District Attorney Katzman and Judge Thayer had resorted to in order to win 
the jury members over to their view that Sacco and Vanzetti were 
representative of the numerous  immigrant radicals and slackers who were 
bent on undermining the nation. He further indicates that branding the two 
men as traitors for having fled the country to Mexico to avoid the draft was 
misleading, since it did not take into account the fact that Attorney General 
Palmer had imposed a reign of terror, in which those whose political 
convictions strayed from a strictly patriotic and thoroughly complacent 
mindset were hounded –if not arrested– and forced to dissemble their views. 
The case spurred demonstrations on behalf of the defendants in major 
cities all around the world. This, in turn, spawned resentment among large 
sectors of American public opinion, which in turn had a negative impact on 
the average American’s attitude toward Sacco and Vanzetti and the many 
people who were defending their cause.  
Playing to the prejudice of public opinion against Italian immigrants in 
general, Reds, slackers, and pacifists, District Attorney Katzmann’s 
tendentious cross-examination of Sacco is a testimony of flagrant uncurtailed 
bias. During the process, the DA scandalously ridiculed Sacco’s political 
beliefs and distorted his testimony in such a way as to rouse bigotry, racial 
discrimination and chauvinism among the jury members. This insidious line 
of questioning in particular, a blatant misuse of judicial power, was admitted 
by Judge Thayer.  




The standards of Massachusetts law stipulate, “Language ought not to be 
permitted which is calculated by (…) appeals to prejudice, to sweep jurors 
beyond a fair and calm consideration of the evidence” (Jackson, 1981: 191). 
Unfortunately for the defendants, this law did not come into effect until 1926; 
that is to say, after Sacco and Vanzetti were convicted. 
The courtroom setting admits a hierarchy at the top of which is the 
presiding judge, whose point of view will have an impact on interactive 
dynamics. Judges determine what is admitted in the record, influence 
discussion topics, control question and answer exchanges, limit speaker turns 
and rule on objections. Second in power are the trial lawyers, who share 
equal status. 
However, in the Sacco-Vanzetti trial, the balance of power between the 
lawyers for the prosecution and the defence was unequal. Katzmann was a 
highly regarded member of the Bostonian establishment, while counsel for 
the defence was undertaken by radical labour lawyers. This power 
asymmetric was strengthened by the predisposition of Judge Thayer to make 
allowances for the DA’s rhetorical excesses during his cross-examination of 
Sacco.  
The dialogic interaction between a trial lawyer and a witness being 
asymmetrical, politeness, face and co-operation are significantly diminished. 
However, Katzmann’s cross-examination was particularly abusive. Following 
is an example: 
 
Q. (…) is your love for the United States of America commensurate with the 
amount of money you can get in this country per week. A. Better conditions, yes. 
Q. Better country to make money, isn’t it? A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Sacco, that is the extent of your love for this country, isn’t it, measured in 
dollars and cents?  (Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 525). 
 
As is expected in dialogic lawyer-witness interaction, where the problem 
of power asymmetry is resolved by the opposing lawyer, counsel for the 
defence McAnarney objects to this question, which hardly resembles an 
enquiry at all but rather a statement. The decision to admit the objection 
depends on the discretion of the trial judge. In this case, Judge Thayer 
(Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 525) asks whether the objection is in reference to 
the way the question was put –“The form of it?”. Counsel for the Defence 
replies, “to the substance and the form”. Thayer advises the DA, “Better 
change that”.   
The judge’s choice of words here is worth considering. The English 
expression had better is used to emphasise immediateness. It may be spoken 
as a warning by one who is in a superior position to someone who is not. 




While ellipsis of the word had maintains the functional meaning, it 
nonetheless implies familiarity and is often used collusively. This line of 
discourse between a presiding judge and a district attorney is inappropriate in 
a court of law. Furthermore, although Judge Thayer addresses McAnarney’s 
objection to the format of the question, the judge egregiously ignores 
Counsel’s objection to its substance. When Counsel once again objects to 
this, Thayer, brushing the protest aside, directly addresses Sacco, telling him, 
“Now you may answer” (Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 525), thereby allowing 
this fatal line of questioning to take its destructive course. 
It is important to bear in mind that the dyadic talk between a lawyer and a 
witness is performed principally for the jury, though a silent audience may 
also be present. This includes the public gallery of observers and members of 
the press. However, determination as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant 
rests exclusively with the jury. Hence its status as ratified recipient is 
maintained throughout the trial. But, though it is directly acknowledged as 
the addressee in the jury instructions stages at the beginning and the end of 
the trial, it is much less explicitly signalled during lawyer-witness interaction. 
At this point the jury as ratified recipient is addressed by way of signals such 
as eye-contact, gestures, body posture, voice pitch and intonation. These 
signals, however, are not recorded in the trial transcript, though they are an 
important part of the direct-examination and cross-examination processes. 
Cotterill (2003: 127) maintains that the yes/no question is the preferred 
strategy for criminal lawyers during the cross-examination phase. She further 
points out that lawyers often “stretch the boundaries of the concept of 
‘question’ to its limits, exploiting the discursive properties of both question 
forms and functions in their attempts to construct persuasive testimony”. The 
following line of questioning during the cross-examination of Sacco is an 
example. Katzmann (Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 523) starts off by asking, 
“Did you say yesterday you love a free country?”, and Sacco replies 
affirmatively. However, his compliant response quickly proves to be harmful. 
For Sacco’s acknowledged love for the United States becomes potentially 
damaging when Katzmann asks him whether he loved the US in May of 
1917. Realising that the DA has set a trap for him, Sacco attempts to elude 
the question. But the DA will only accept a yes or no response. When Sacco 
insists that he cannot answer “in one word”, Katzmann says derisively, 
“Don’t you know whether you did or not?”.  
After Counsel for the Defence’s subsequent objection is overruled by 
Judge Thayer, the DA repeats his question for the seventh time. Wishing to 
avoid a constrained response, Sacco insists, “That is pretty hard for me to say 
in one word, Mr. Katzmann”. Exercising his prerogative, though, the 
prosecutor tells the defendant, “There are two words you can use, Mr. Sacco, 




yes or no. Which is it to be?” (Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 523). Sacco is left 
with no alternative but to respond with a compliant yes: a damaging 
admission.  
In contrast to direct examination, the cross-examining process is 
essentially confrontational and destructive. Characteristically, the questions 
contain interdependent interrogative layers. These multiple embeddings 
compel witnesses to agree to propositions they might otherwise not accept. 
As one would expect a seasoned trial lawyer to be, District Attorney 
Katzmann was dextrous at doing just that. What strikes the reader of the trial 
transcripts, however, is not so much the DA’s skill at posing multiple 
questions, but his undisguised scorn for the defendants and the derision that 
was allowed by the presiding judge to be openly expressed in the 
prosecutor’s line of questioning. The post of district attorney is certainly no 
job for the fainthearted. But Katzmann’s derogation of the defendants’ 
character and beliefs, which the trial judge consistently admitted, went 
beyond the call of professional duty. The embeddings of many of the DA’s 
questions were obvious traducements of the defendants.   
To take but one example, Katzmann wants to underscore the fact that 
Sacco travelled to Mexico in 1917, and that in doing so the defendant was a 
coward. The DA accuses Sacco of “running away” (Joughlin & Morgan, 
1978: 524) not only from the country but from his own wife and child as 
well. 
 
Q. Don’t you think going away from your country is a vulgar thing to do when 
she needs you? A. I don’t believe in war. 
Q. You don’t believe in war? A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you think it is a cowardly thing to do what you did? A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you think it was a brave thing to do what you did? A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you think it would be a brave thing to go away from your own wife? A. 
No. 
Q. When she needed you? A. No (Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 525). 
 
Katzmann’s urge to disparage the witness borders on the absurd when his 
censorious attention turns to the subject of food. A sinister cast is placed on 
Sacco’s return from Mexico when the DA poses the following 
statement/question: “Then, I take it, you came back to the United States first 
to get something to eat. Is that right?” (Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 526). The 
multiple implication here not only discredits the defendant, whose 
antimilitarism the DA has already publicly scorned, but also suggests that, 
somewhat like a roaming hungry beast, Sacco made his way back to the US 
in search of prey. Presumably, the implication is that Sacco eventually found 




what he was looking for on the day of the hold-up and murder in South 
Braintree.  
Katzmann further manages to insert another damaging assertion to the 
effect that Sacco’s earlier admitted love for the United States of America is 
largely monetary. Greatly offended, Sacco tries to set the record straight. 
“No, no, money, never loved money” (Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 527), only 
to encounter once again the DA’s scorn: “Never loved money?”. Once more, 
Katzmann has adroitly posed a question with multiple embedded meanings.  
Not only does the question serve to demonstrate the prosecutor’s surprise, it 
also suggests that Sacco is a liar and a person who hides behind false ideals. 
When Sacco desperately tries to undo the nefarious implications by insisting, 
“No, money never satisfaction to me”, Katzmann once again responds by 
making a mockery of the defendant’s statement of a deeply felt principle.  
The predominating modality used by Katzmann is that of someone who is 
in an authoritative position. He uses the imperative form transformed into 
closed and declarative questions. Katzmann does not include in his cross-
examination modals of permission or volition, thereby eliminating the 
defendant’s authority in answering the questions put to him. This is 
consistent with the view that Katzmann is not asking questions at all but is 
rather forcing the defendant to countenance what are in fact statements the 
DA is making about Sacco to the jury.  
Katzmann uses negative assertions to counteract and subvert positive 
assertions made by the defendant. We have already seen how the DA began a 
destructive line of questioning with the simple question “Did you say 
yesterday you love a free country?” (Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 523), in 
reference to a positive assertion which Sacco had made the previous day. In 
response to Sacco’s affirmative reply, Katzmann subverts the assertion with a 
negative assertion that is embedded in the form of a positive closed question: 
“Did you love this country in the month of May, 1917?”. The embedded 
negative assertion is immediately understood by the defendant and –one may 
assume– by the jury. The implication, of course, is that Sacco could not 
possibly love the United States if he abandoned the country in its hour of 
need during the war.  
In this context, a relational value of a vocabulary item (Fairclough, 1989: 
178) is adroitly engaged by Katzmann in his use of the term this country. 
Katzmann’s “this country” presents a relational value embedded in the 
implication it makes. The underlying meaning is what Fairclough (1989: 127) 
refers to as the inclusive we. The this in Katzmann’s this country is in fact a 
transformation of our, where what is implied is that this is our country, a 
place where we were born and live –we being Katzmann, the Court and the 
jury but not the defendants. The DA draws attention to the fact that Sacco 




claims to love this country. But the destructive implication is that We do not 
show our love for this country by running way from her in her hour of need.  
Naturally, the implied We inferred by this country is totally mysticatory. 
The ambivalence, however, allows the DA to present this country in the light 
of a betrayed love, as when the DA asks, “And in order to show your love for 
this United States of America when she was about to call on you to become a 
soldier you ran away to Mexico?” (Joughlin & Morgan, 1978: 524). A 
moment later the DA asks, “Is that your idea of showing your love for this 
country?”. When Sacco hesitates, Katzmann repeats the question, replacing 
this country with the far more emotionally charged word, America. To 
Sacco’s affirmative reply, Katzmann belittles the defendant even further by 
asking him, “And would it be your idea of showing your love for your wife 
that when she needed you ran away from her?”. 
Court language is not merely an example of an expression of social 
practice but rather it reveals how discourse serves in certain contexts to 
exercise power. The discourse exhibited in the Sacco-Vanzetti trial was 
institutionalised and regulated. Considering discourse as a regulative body 
(Jäger, 2001: 35), it is plain to see that the spectrum was restricted by a 
process of conscious regulation. District Attorney Katzmann, Judge Thayer, 
the jury, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts and the Federal Courts, as well 
as Governor Fuller and his Advisory Committee, represented a unified social, 
ethnic, national, and racial grouping whose thought patterns were constrained 
by a system of classification that disallowed alternative systems.  
The issues inherent in the Sacco-Vanzetti case, which were explored in 
great depth by, among others, Ehrmann (1969), Joughin & Morgan (1978), 
Young & Kaiser (1985), and Avrich (1991), were not officially addressed 
until fifty years after sentence was carried out.  On August 23, 1977, Michael 
Dukakis (1978: 799), Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
issued a Proclamation, in which he declared that “any stigma and disgrace 
should be forever removed from the names of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo 
Vanzetti, from the names of their families and descendants, and so, from the 
name of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts”.  
As will be shown further on, the family of Niccola Sacco subsequently 
protested that this was not enough, and demanded a full pardon. 
Nevertheless, it was, and still remains, the first and only official attempt –if 
symbolically– to acknowledge, in Governor Dukakis’s (1978: 799) words, 
“these tragic events” and to “draw from their historic lessons the resolve to 
prevent the forces of intolerance, fear, and hatred from ever again uniting to 
overcome the rationality, wisdom, and fairness to which our legal system 
aspires”. 




In his Proclamation, delivered on 23 August 1977, on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, Dukakis (1978: 799) pointed out that the “atmosphere of their 
trial and appeals was permeated by prejudice against foreigners and hostility 
toward unorthodox political views”, and he added, “The conduct of many of 
the officials involved in the case shed serious doubt on their willingness and 
ability to conduct the prosecution and trial of Sacco and Vanzetti fairly and 
impartially”. Furthermore, the Governor noted that the “limited scope of 
appellate review then in effect did not allow a new trial to be ordered based 
on the prejudicial effect of the proceedings as a whole”.  
Dukakis’ proclamation was the culmination of process which he begun 
when the then Governor of the State of Massachusetts asked his Chief Legal 
Counsel, Daniel A. Taylor, “whether there are substantial grounds for 
believing (...) that Sacco and Vanzetti were unfairly convicted and executed, 
and (...) if so what action can now be appropriately taken” (Taylor, 1978: 
797). Taylor’s subsequent research led him to the conclude in his Report to 
the Governor in the Matter of Sacco and Vanzetti that “there are substantial, 
indeed compelling, grounds for believing that the Sacco and Vanzetti legal 
proceedings were permeated with unfairness”, and he advises Governor 
Dukakis “that a proclamation issued by you would be appropriate”.  
In his report, Taylor (1978: 759) address in detail both of the questions 
the Governor put to him. In responding to the first question, “Were Sacco and 
Vanzetti convicted and executed after a fair trial demonstrating their guilt of 
murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and after an adequate review of that 
trial?”, Taylor describes the basic chronology of events, presents the grounds 
for continuing doubt, and discusses the review of the case by the Supreme 
Judicial Court.  
According to Taylor (1978: 761), the grounds for continuing doubt 
“encompass both the conduct of the trial itself, with the consequence that 
there is doubt whether (...) a jury in possession of all the facts would have 
returned a guilty verdict”.  He further mentions that “the mere fact that for 
the last fifty years countless authors have debated the merits of the case, 
without a clear victory either for the proponents of innocence or for the 
proponents of guilt, is in itself a reason to think that a miscarriage of justice 
may have occurred”. 
Taylor (1978: 762) cites British historian Samuel Eliot Morison’s The 
Oxford History of the American People to suggest that the Sacco-Vanzetti 
case “was the offshoot of the ... whipped-up anti-red hysteria” of the period 
just after the First World War. Taylor then observes that the defendants 
“were aliens, poor and espoused a political ideology –anarchism–, which 
struck fear in the hearts of many Americans”. He concedes that though the 




extent to which this may have influenced the jury’s verdict and Judge 
Thayer’s subsequent denial of the new trial motions is susceptible to debate, 
it is nonetheless “irrefutable” that there existed at the very least a “a strong 
possibility” for that to happen. 
After expounding on the ground for continuing doubt, the report then 
focuses on the review of the case by the Supreme Judicial Court. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reviewed and subsequently overruled each of the 
thirty-three exceptions raised by the defendants, as well as the exceptions to 
the denial for new trials because of newly uncovered evidence. It based each 
of its decisions on standard Massachusetts legal procedure, which at that time 
held that standard review “rested within the discretion of the trial judge” 
(Taylor, 1978: 769). Taylor further explains that the standard review used 
was grounded on a civil case decision handed down in 1920, shortly before 
Sacco and Vanzetti were arrested. As a result, the fate of Sacco and Vanzetti 
depended completely on Judge Thayer, in spite of the new evidence and 
indications presented showing that the prosecution had used prejudice to 
sway the jury.  
The irony of this, as the report indicates, is that “at almost all other times 
in the history of the Commonwealth greater protection for defendants in 
capital cases has been required” (Taylor, 1978: 770). Tragically, in 
November, 1927, just three months after Sacco and Vanzetti had been 
executed the Judicial Council recommended the enactment of new provisions 
for reviewing capital offence cases. The legislation was subsequently enacted 
by the General Court twelve years later. As Governor Dukakis (1978: 798) 
explained in his Proclamation of 1977, Chapter 341 of the Acts of 1939 was 
the “direct result of their case”. The Governor concludes,  
 
In light of the foregoing, a serious question exists and will continue to exist 
whether the guilt of Sacco and Vanzetti was properly determined. The jury was 
invited to decide the case on the basis of appeals to prejudice; the eyewitness 
testimony was conflicting...; many of the facts which might have altered the 
jury’s conclusion were not presented at trial, including further eyewitnesses 
evidence and other important pieces of evidence concerning identification; and 
the evidence concerning the defendants’ ‘consciousness of guilt’ at the time of 
arrest was overblown, and may well have been viewed through the perspective 
of a cross-examination as much calculated to damn the defendants as to advance 
the cause of truth. 
 
Taylor (1978: 768) notes that a “review by a different and superior 
tribunal” would indeed have been warranted, but, he states, “Unfortunately, 
the system for reviewing murder cases at the time of Sacco’s and Vanzetti’s 




convictions and executions failed to provide the safeguards now present, 
safeguards which might well have prevented a miscarriage of justice”.  He 
suggests that to “acknowledge that mistakes occur is not to challenge the 
importance of the criminal law in the protection of society, nor to denigrate in 
any fashion the criminal justice system of the Commonwealth”. Furthermore, 
Taylor (1978: 769) reminds his readers that it was “the possibility that a 
mistake was committed in the executions of Sacco and Vanzetti that led to a 
strengthening in the system of appellate review of capital cases in this 
Commonwealth”. 
Finally, Taylor’s (1978: 773) Report addresses the second question, 
which Governor Dukakis had originally put to his Chief Legal Counsel with 
regard to the Sacco-Vanzetti case, as to whether, “in the light of the criminal 
justice standards of today”, Sacco and Vanzetti were indeed “unfairly 
convicted and executed (...) what action can now appropriately be taken”. 
Taylor responds by explaining that “the normal way in which relief is granted 
after conviction of a crime is by exercise of the pardoning power”. In his 
capacity as Chief Legal Counsel, Taylor (1978: 774) informs Governor 
Dukakis,  
 
Assuming that by petitioner the Legislature meant to denominate the convicted 
person, the statute would seem to indicate that posthumous pardons cannot be 
granted; or, at the least, that the pardoning power in its ordinary course is not the 
appropriate vehicle for addressing a matter such as this. 
 
Additionally, Taylor (1978: 774) reports that “in present day 
circumstances there are no legal consequences to conviction for a felony that 
last beyond the death of the felon”. Moreover, he indicates that the law states 
that a “grant of pardon carries ‘an imputation of guilt’ ”.  Taylor (1978: 776), 
therefore, suggests that “the granting of a pardon to Sacco and Vanzetti after 
their deaths would be a null act, because pardon is void without an 
acceptance, and no power of acceptance exists”. While he further underscores 
“the very real possibility that a grievous miscarriage of justice occurred with 
their deaths”, Taylor (1978: 777) nonetheless sustains, “A pardon, carrying 
the connotation that they were in fact guilty, and appearing as but a merciful 
act, with the implication that they would have, even now, welcomed it, would 
serve not to dignify, but rather to denigrate, their own claims to innocence”. 
He concludes, “In short, a pardon, or any of the forms of clemency 
bespeaking of a pardon, is not the proper remedy”. 
Taylor (1978: 777) further declares that because “no relief with 
substantial legal effect is possible”, the only way to remedy the situation is by 
removing “the stigma placed on them by their conviction and execution”. He, 




therefore, recommends that a statement be made: “The necessary statement 
should take the form of a proclamation issued by the Governor”. 
Governor Dukakis’s subsequent Proclamation did not satisfy the families 
of Sacco and Vanzetti in Italy. In a visit that he made to Madrid on the 
occasion of the premier of Luis Araujo’s (1996) play, Vanzeti, in October, 
1993, Ermette Sacco, the son of Niccola Sacco’s older brother, declared that 
he and Vicenzina Vanzetti, Bartolomeo’s sister, who is said to have 
absconded with the ashes of both men back to Italy hidden and mixed 
together in a bombshell, wanted nothing less than the “total rehabilitation” 
(Torres, 1993: 31) of their relatives.  
The occasion of Ermette Sacco’s visit to Spain received considerable 
attention in the national press. The details of the Sacco family’s efforts to 
clear the names of both Niccola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were 
narrated. For example, it was reported that when in 1966 the families were 
informed by Michele Catalano, a lawyer friend of theirs, that a book had been 
published in Germany depicting the men as “murderers who robbed and 
killed people in order to finance their political party” (Pascual, 1993: 82), the 
families decided to actively pursue a campaign to have their relatives 
officially absolved of guilt. In February, 1993, Ermette Sacco and Vicenzina 
Vanzetti asked President Bill Clinton to intercede on their behalf 
(Cantalapiedra, 1993: 54). In an interview Ermette Sacco gave in Madrid, he 
stated, “We wanted all of America, with Clinton taking the lead, to 
acknowledge their innocence” (Pascual, 1993: 82). Ermette Sacco further 
explained that the families had petitioned Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, President of 
the Republic of Italy, who is said to have taken the matter up with President 
Clinton. Eleven years earlier, the family in Italy had already approached the 
then President of the Republic of Italy, Sandro Pertini, in an effort to have the 
names of their relatives cleared. Pertini is said to have brought the matter up 
with then President Reagan, needless to say to no avail (Aganzo, 1993: 26).  
The worthy intent of Governor Michael Dukakis to address the issue was 
a courageous act for a major political figure to undertake, all the more so in 
view of the fact that he would later become the Democratic Party’s candidate 
in the Presidential elections of 1988. The details of the Sacco-Vanzetti case 
obviate the fact that Niccola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti at least deserved 
a retrial. But those who then wielded their power abusively in the name of 
national security and ideology were allowed to undermine justice, thanks in 
no small measure to the clamour of the ideological noise-machine and 
intellectual shirking, which in turn discredited the United States in the eyes of 
the world and provided its enemies with a powerful propagandistic tool. 
Sadly, almost seventy years on, America’s moral integrity is once again 
being jeopardized by the flawed rational of some of its leaders, who with 




security once again as their standard, cede ground to dictators and warlords 
by ignoring Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. As the execution of Sacco 
and Vanzetti did in 1927, today the kidnapping of terror suspects and 
shipping them off to covert prisons abroad, or the detention of suspected 
“unlawful combatants” in Guantánamo where they are denied due process, 
disgraces a great nation and serves only to undermine its security, since by 
eroding moral standing criminal acts of injustice by others is potentially 
justified.   
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